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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
In today’s industrial practice, safety, reliability or
availability artifacts such as fault trees, Markov models or
FMEAs are mainly created manually by experts, often
distinctively decoupled from systems engineering activities.
Significant efforts, costs and timely requirements are involved
to conduct the required analyses. In this paper, we describe a
novel integrated model-based approach of systems engineering
and dependability analyses. The behavior of system
components is specified by UML state machines determining
intended/correct and undesired/faulty behavior. Based on this
information, our approach automatically generates different
dependability analyses in the form of fault trees. Hence,
alternative system layouts can easily be evaluated. The same
applies for simple variations of the logical input-output
relations of logical units such as controllers. We illustrate the
feasibility of our approach with the help of simple examples
using a prototypical implementation of the presented concepts.
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety, reliability or availability artifacts are essential with
respect to the homologation of complex systems or solutions as
well as with respect to the fulfillment of corresponding
contractual obligations in general.
Nowadays, such dependability artifacts for technical
systems or solutions are often distinctively decoupled from
systems engineering activities. Moreover, corresponding
artifacts are usually generated manually by reliability,
availability, maintainability or safety (RAMS) experts and
related teams subsequently to design decisions. Significant
efforts, costs and time for experts are required to generate the
needed dependability artifacts especially in case of complex
system designs. Moreover, the increasing complexity of
modern system architectures such as for instance in Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) that reconfigure during run-time and
the predominant importance of short time-to-market entail the
need for model-based and automated methods in systems
engineering as well as in the dependability realm.
The method presented in this paper describes a new
integrated approach of systems engineering and dependability
1 https://www.omg.org/spec/UML/
analyses. It involves state-of-the-art component-based system
design using standard Unified Modeling Language (UML)1 or
System Modelling Language (SysML)2 methodology. The
behavior of system components is specified by UML state
machines determining intended/correct and undesired/faulty
behavior. Given this information, the user interaction is limited
to defining the failure criterion, the so-called top event of a fault
tree, by choosing proposed state combinations at the system
boundary. This allows automatic generation of fault trees for
e.g. reliability and safety similarly by simply adapting the top
event definition. In case of system modifications due to
changed topology or functionality automated fault tree
generation is continued given the underlying failure definitions
persist. Consequently, a huge advantage of this method is that
the fulfillment of dependability-related requirements can be
continuously verified and assured. This even holds in case of
CPS that reconfigure during run-time. In addition, efforts once
spent for the definition of components can easily be reused in
different contexts and by different users.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: First, we
present related work in section 2. Then, we present in section 3
our approach to automatically generate RAMS analyses based
on the functional model in form of UML state charts. Section 4
provides a case study to demonstrate the feasibility of our
approach. Section 5 summarizes this paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Nowadays, in industrial practice dependability analyses for
technical systems or solutions (which includes human activities
for system operation and maintenance) such as Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA and their derivatives), Fault Trees
or Markov Chains typically are generated manually by experts
or related teams. Significant efforts, costs and timely
requirements are involved especially in case of complicated or
challenging applications. This also includes efforts to
synchronize between system designers and RAMS experts and
comprises the risk of misunderstanding and false interpretation
resulting in inappropriate dependability analyses.
In previous work, efforts have been made in order to
partially automate the generation of safety analyses. [1,2,3,4,5]
2 https://sysml.org/
present approaches to generate FMEA tables from system
models. In [6,7,8,9,10] fault tree models are generated from
system models to perform safety analyses. To construct the
analyses the system models are often annotated with failure
propagation models [11,12,13,14,15]. However, all these
approaches focus on the system architecture as input and often
require manual modeling of the failure propagation. Preparation
efforts are very high in order to be able to generate RAMS
analyses.
Other previous approaches deal with the automated
generation of fault trees from behavioral specification in form
of state machines [16,17,18,19] or mode automat [20,21].
Approaches like Altarica [22] are also available as software
tools for model-based safety analysis (e.g. Simfia Neo).
However, in all of these approaches the generation of fault trees
requires manual annotation of failure modes by RAMS experts.
Moreover, all previous approaches focus on the generation of
safety analyses whereas our approach presented in this paper
not only allows the generation of safety analyses but also of
reliability or availability analyses. Hence, manual effort to
create the model is only required once, and several RAMS
analyses can be generated based on this model. Moreover,
component models can be stored in a library and be reused for
the modeling of new systems.
3 AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF RAMS ANALYSES
Model-based system engineering got a lot of attention in
the last decades and paved its way into industrial practice.
System engineers describe the technical specification in a
model-based way with a standardized generic functional
description (e.g. with UML or SysML). This description
includes the components of the system and its relations using
input and output port definitions, which are interconnected, e.g.
by using SysML Internal Block Diagrams (see Fig. 1). The
functional behavior of the system in the approach presented in
this paper is described by modeling each component using
UML state machines. The states of a state machine represent
the nominal behavior of the component but also the failure
modes of the component by dedicated states (so-called failure
states). The behavior of the component in each state is defined
using the Object Constraint Language (OCL), see Fig. 2.
Figure 1 – Exemplary System S composed of 3 components
For every state of the state machine the relevant output
state, which may depend on input states, is defined. Output
states of a component at the system boundary (e.g. component
C3 in Fig. 1) depend on the values or states at the inputs of this
component and its UML state machine. The inputs to the
component depend on the UML state machines of the connected
components and their input values and so forth. Some UML
failure states of the component may be modeled as not
depending on input values. Hence, the output values only
depend on the failure mode itself. This may be  adequate for
certain failure modes e.g. with inherent failure monitoring that
reports a faulty state on its output in case an internal failure such
as for instance a memory defect has been detected.
Figure 2 – Exemplary UML state machine for component C3
 For instance, one state of the state machine of a cable
segment may relate to a short circuit failure mode on the output
side. This consequently leads to a very low resistance on the
output of this component independently from the signals on the
input side (reasonable technical input states supposed). In case
of logic devices or units a useful generic approach is to
predefine general behavior and known failure modes by means
of corresponding states. Then it is up to the user to add specific
logical input-output dependencies according to a pre-specified
rule set to implement the intended functionality.
It is supposed that the generic description of the component
or sub-system reflects certain standardized implementation
concepts or architectural patterns, e.g. with respect to sensor
circuitry, signaling or communication protocols which
facilitates system development. The system designer can select,
detail or enrich the relevant component functionality with the
help of these architectural patterns in the course of the system
definition. Therefore, the system engineer will only encounter
a one-time effort in order to prepare the system or solution for
the generation of the different, relevant RAMS analyses.
Moreover, the defined failure behavior can be delivered by the
supplier together with the component as digital twin. This data
can be reused each time the system component is implemented
in a solution.
Based on the information about the system structure and
the functional behavior of each component, it is possible to
generate RAMS analyses using our approach comprises the
following steps:
1) The user selects the relevant states (input and output states)
at the system boundary to define the failure criterion. In
case of a “false negative failure” this could for instance be
an output state or several output states indicating the
absence of a to-be-detected hazard while in fact the
corresponding input to the system signals the hazard being
present. The set of possible output states can be easily
derived in case the corresponding component only entails
states with explicit output values. If output states are
present, which depend on their input states, it is required to
involve upstream components in the analysis. Hence, even
a full system analysis may be required.
2) Once the failure criterion is set the algorithm to generate
the fault tree can be started: Failure modes that cannot
occur according to the selection of input states at the
system boundary have to be neglected for further analyses.
If there are UML failure states of the component at the
system boundary that are independent from input states
(technical reasonable values supposed) and that result in
one of the selected system output states the corresponding
failure modes are integrated into the fault tree under an OR-
gate. UML states not depending on input values and not
resulting in an output value that represents one of the
system output states according to the chosen failure
criterion can be ignored for further analyses.
3) UML states depending on input states must be further
evaluated in order to determine whether the resulting states
can match the defined output states according to the failure
criterion. Therefore, it is required to include the UML state
machines of the upstream components. If corresponding
failure modes directly lead to the selected output states,
these also have to be included in the fault tree under the
OR gate. Again, evaluation is straight-forward for failure
states with explicit output values that do not depend on
input values.
4) If the implemented logic of a component requires a certain
combination of inputs to result in the selected output states
corresponding failure states have to be integrated into the
fault tree under an AND gate.
5) The algorithm is terminated once the system boundary is
reached and the fault tree is displayed.
Since in this algorithm failure modes (i.e. states which must be
evaluated) can be neglected according to the selection of the
criteria, it scales good even in case of an increasing number of
components and system states.
4 CASE STUDY
In this case study, we demonstrate the feasibility of our
approach by means of a fire detection system model comprising
three equal fire detectors (FD1, FD2, FD3), three equal cable
segments (C1, C2, C3) and one controller unit evaluating the
fire detectors’ signals (“Alarm”, if a fire is detected via infrared
signal, and otherwise “no Alarm”) transmitted by cable
segments (see Fig. 3). The so-called “safe logic” implemented
in CPU1 triggers an alarm unless the three inputs to CPU1
signal “no Alarm”. Alternatively, the controller unit can be
implemented in CPU2 using a so-called “voting logic” which
triggers the alarm, if the majority of inputs (two in this example)
to CPU2 signal “Alarm”.
For each of the components in this exemplary system, a
UML state machine is defined. The fire detector is modelled
with four states. The initial state is the “NormalState” in which
the component is correctly working. The behavior of the
detector is defined in this state using OCL. Moreover, the fire
detector has 3 different failure modes (FM): MissedAlarm,
FalseAlarm, and Internal-Failure-Detected (see Fig. 4). The
latter one is independent of inputs states while the other failure
modes can only contribute to the component behavior in case
an infrared signal is present (MissedAlarm) or absent
(FalseAlarm) at the system inputs.
Figure 3 – Fire Detection System composed of different
components
The cable component has besides the “NormalState” two
failure modes: “Open-Circuit” and “Short-Circuit” (see Fig. 5).
Figure 4 – UML state machine of the Fire Detector
component
Figure 5 – UML state machine of the Cable component
The controller component consists of the “NormalState” as
well as the failure states “Internal-Failure-Detected”,
“No_Output”, and “Unknown_Signal”. These failure states are
the same in CPU1 and CPU2. The two variants only differ w.r.t.
the logic defined in the NormalState (see Fig. 6 and Fig. 7).
Figure 6 – UML state machine of controller CPU1 with
safe logic
Figure 7 – UML state machine of controller CPU2 with
voting logic
Based on the description of the system structure in form of
the SysML Internal Block Diagram IBD (in Fig. 3) and the
definition of the behavior of each component in form of UML
state machines (see Fig. 4 to Fig. 7), it is possible to
automatically generate RAMS analyses for the exemplary
system for different failure criteria as described in Section 3.
4.1 Variant 1: False Negative (Safety Analysis)
In this variant, CPU1 is used as the controller in the fire
detector systems. Moreover, all input states to the fire detectors
are set to infrared signal being present indicating a potential
fire, while the output state selected for CPU1 is
“CPU_NoAlarm”. This failure criterion relates to a potential
safety-critical event - a missed alarm in case of a fire.
The resulting fault tree for this failure criterion is displayed
in Fig. 8. As expected for the safe-logic implementation, a
safety-critical failure “CPU_NoAlarm” only occurs, if all three
fire detectors (FD1, FD2, FD3) simultaneously miss the
infrared signal (failure state “MissedAlarm”).
Figure 8 – Generated fault tree for the safety analysis of
the example with CPU1 (safe logic)
4.2 Variant 1: False Positive (Availability Analysis)
An availability analysis can also be derived by an adaption
of the failure criterion. In this case, the output state selected for
CPU1 is “CPU_Alarm”. This failure criterion relates to all
failures leading to a false alarm, i.e. an alarm occurs without a
fire and hence without infrared radiation being present which
constitutes an undesired source of unavailability. Therefore, all
input states to the fire detectors are set to infrared signal not
being present.
The resulting fault tree for the availability analysis is
depicted in Fig. 9. It contains no failure mode of CPU1, since
normal behavior is required to output the “CPU_Alarm” signal.
Also, it does not comprise the “missed alarm” failure modes of
the fire detectors, since the input state definition excludes
infrared radiation. All other failure modes (“FalseAlarm”,
“Internal-Failure-Detected”) are included to the fault tree for
availability analysis, since any deviation from the “no_Alarm”
signal triggers “CPU_Alarm” according to the safe logic
implemented.
Figure 9 – Generated fault tree for availability analysis of
the example with CPU1 (safe logic)
4.3 Variant 2: False Negative (Safety Analysis)
In this variant, CPU2 is used as the controller in the fire
detector systems. Again, all input states to the fire detectors are
set to infrared signal being present indicating a potential fire,
while the output state selected for CPU1 is “CPU_NoAlarm”.
Figure 10 – Generated fault tree for the safety analysis of
the example with CPU2 (voting logic)
The resulting fault tree for this failure criterion is depicted
in Fig. 10. In contrast to the safe-logic implementation of CPU1
(cf. Fig. 8), a safety-critical failure “CPU_NoAlarm” occurs, if
two out of three fire detectors (FD1, FD2, FD3) simultaneously
miss the infrared signal. This behavior is respected and
represented in the automatically generated fault tree by the OR
gate and the three AND gates (2 out of 3 logic).
4.4 Variant 2: False Positive (Availability Analysis)
Again, an availability analysis is generated for the variant
with CPU2 as the controller using the same criteria as described
in Section 4.2. The automatically generated fault tree is
depicted in Fig. 11. It also includes a voting logic, since due to
the voting logic implemented in CPU2 “CPU_Alarm” is
triggered, if two fire detectors fail to send the “no_Alarm”
signal (in any combination of failures).
Figure 11 – Generated fault tree for the availability
analysis of the example with CPU2 (voting logic)
5 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a novel integrated approach of
systems engineering and dependability analyses. Based on the
functional description of system components our method
generates dependability analyses such as fault tree analyses
automatically. Once the system model is implemented the
user’s interaction is limited to defining the failure criteria for
the top events of the required fault trees by choosing
corresponding state combinations from proposed states at the
system boundary. The fault trees are then automatically
generated and displayed and can be evaluated with
corresponding analysis software. Alternative system
compositions as well as different logical functionality for
logical units can easily be evaluated using this approach, while
the expert has to define the failure behavior only once.
Currently our approach is limited to systems with simple logical
dependencies between inputs and outputs. Implementation
examples support the feasibility of the approach. Future work
will be the enhancement of our approach to represent time-
dependent behavior and to generate FMEA sheets automatically
for RAMS analyses. Also, the tooling capabilities will be
extended correspondingly. We plan to evaluate our approach in
detail using more complex system configurations.
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